Moral nihilism, I think.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/#Reg

>>27
You don't think meaning is inherent in the actions of living beings? In other words, the reason I choose to not kill person A is because I'm fulfilling the ultimate evolutionary design of my species. Instead of a supernatural oversight giving us meaning I believe it's our natural design that gives us meaning - or reason to act. In order to "live the good life" you ought live as your species evolved to act.

Also sentimentalism usually comes out on top. Once broken down, rationalism never works out. Things are right be cause they feel right. You have an internal gauge of right and wrong and any rational explanation you apply is after you have the feeling.

So that leads to cultural relativism, unfortunately.

But in general we act on the principals of utilitarianism. Yeah, it doesn't always work out. That's because we also hold that harm to one person is not justified in order to help any number of other people unless express consent is given. Also, some pleasures are particularly great and given precedence over particular dis pleasures.

Almost every moral theory out there, from Christianity to Objectivism, at least pretends to be utilitarian. There's always the idea of, "everyone who follows my philosophy will be happier, and everyone else descends into immoral degenerates".

There's a sort of utilitarian sentimentalism out there, like the last poster said, that people generally seem to go for. Other ethical theories are still needed for fluff and justification, because pursuing pleasure directly just feels empty.

>>30
See, my problem with utilitarianism is that it lacks foundation. The only moral rule is that happiness is good and that more happiness is better than little happiness. Where this happiness comes from, or what the reason for the happiness is, is to the utilitarian, completely irrelevant. A mass murderer could very well do something morally just, says the utilitarian, as long as his happiness exceeds the sadness of the people he kills and those close to them.

Even if we assume that this is correct - that happiness is indeed the highest moral value - there's still no known way to measure it. We can't actually know what creates the most happiness, or if one person's happiness exceeds another person's sadness, or if one group of people's hypothetical happiness exceeds another group's hypothetical happines. The only thing the philosophy, as such, can do is provide excuses for whatever action you want. You only have to claim that the intention was to create more happiness.

If we on the other hand take Objectivism which indeed talks about happiness, though only as a result of living a moral life - never as the goal, there's still one big difference that bugged me like hell when I read philosophy in school (and this doesn't just apply to Objectivism but essentially any philosophy that isn't utilitarianism) and should be, to me, reason enough for why utilitarianism is worse than any other philosophy: Objectivism gives clears guidelines for how to be moral and as an en result becoming happy which is the goal of the utilitarian, but the utilitarian doesn't actually have guidelines himself. The utilitarian only has a broad goal - that everyone should be happy (or at the very least that there should be a greater total of happiness) - but that result is the same as for essentially every other philosophy (provided that they are correct and not based on the idea of being grumpy all the time) and those have much better and consistent guidelines for what it really means to be moral, what good actions are, how to be consequent in your actions and so on, and how you, in the end, become happy.

One thing that you have to consider with religious morality is that (in most cases) it is coming from the entity that created everything. They made the universe and the rules by which it works. So when they tell you that, let's say, adultery is wrong, it's because they objectively know so.

So for someone that believes, I'd say that being directly told by the one who would know should be pretty convincing.

>>28
"Things are right because they feel right", could be true but there is no reason to think so. Same goes for meaning. Whether or not your actions lead to more or less suffering (or survival) isn't necessarily related to them being right or wrong.
How would you know if you really do have an internal gauge?

Moral theories are universally ridiculous. All attempts to develop a moral code that should apply to everyone are failures. People have ethics, and ethics can be analysed, but no ethical model can be proven to be 'correct'.

People do what they want. People may not have a clear conception of what they want or why they want it, but they do what they will nonetheless, and this may sometimes involve compromise and dissatisfaction. A decision may be considered to have a 'moral' component only because certain subjects are designated as being moral issues. For example, interpersonal relationships, the conception of property, and the way we treat animals are all considered 'moral'. In truth, though, decisions we make regarding these issues are made because we desire one outcome over others, just like any other decision, for example, what type of drink to order at a bar, or what activities to undertake on a day off.

Picking the 'right' ethical code is a waste of time. It's an arbitrary decision, just like any other. Given that ethics can be considered a model of behaviour, and that everyone thus has ethics, it strikes me that it's more fulfilling to analyse your own ethics and come to understand them. That way, you can modify your own behaviour to extricate the potential for compromise and clearly understand the paths that lead to the actions you take from the combination of your instincts and experience.

My 'ethical code' requires me to analyse my own behaviour and modify it to make my life more satisfying. I suppose you could call it living meta-ethics. Wherever my behaviour might be considered to have a 'moral' component, it has to derive from my instincts or the path of least resistance in society, not a bunch of nebulous non-concepts invented by some overrated dead guy.

>>40
>Moral theories are universally ridiculous. All attempts to develop a moral code that should apply to everyone are failures.
It is clear that you think of moral theories in the sense of christian dogmas - a list of does and don'ts that is to never be trespassed. Objectivism doesn't have that, for example. That philosophy rather gives guidelines for how to think so that you in turn can act morally. It is, however, in the end a philosophy about thinking for yourself and coming to your own conclussions in a rational way.

>>50

The only thing clear is that I've analysed moral theories and determined that they are bullshit. Rand's work is no different. She suggests that enlightened self-interest is morally good, but provides absolutely no proof of it. She couches the is-ought gap with complicated terminology, some derived from philosophical academia and some she has invented herself; a classic tactic that has been used by bullshit philosophers for centuries.

In fact you can't prove that anything is morally good. You can define something as morally good, as Rand has done, but it makes no sense to try to prove it, and by defining something as 'morally good' you've done a disservice to your reader; 'morally good' is a practically meaningless term.

She's making claims that require evidence, not thinking, to prove, as well. She claims that self-interest as opposed to altruism makes someone happy. Right... actually that's some shit you have to prove. For one thing, you have to provide a definition of happiness that everyone's comfortable with, which is actually quite difficult.

Bleh, Rand... grumble... I could go on, but I'm already irritable tonight and I'm supposed to be working.

>>53

>you can't prove that anything is morally good
>'morally good' is a practically meaningless term.

These are also claims that require justification, which you haven't provided. In fact, anyone who claims morality doesn't exist bears a positive burden of proof just as much as any advocate of morality does, since such a claim runs counter to many people's experiences.

It's very easy to derive an "ought" from an "is" and people do it all the time. If you want to win a race you should run quickly. If you want to bake a cake you should follow the recipe. In general, if you will an end, you must will the means, or otherwise give up the end. (In fact, if it was REALLY impossible to derive an ought from an is, we would have to object philosophically whenever doctors prescribe treatment to sick patients.)

This was what I think Rand had in mind. Human beings are creatures that act to attain goals. Each person's continued existence is the ultimate means to all his/her goals. Hence, all human beings should pursue and sustain their lives, in such a way as to best be able to continue to live. (Even, paradoxically, if those goals include committing suicide.) Life is the ultimate means and thus the ultimate end. And if life is your goal, there are certain things you ought and ought not to do (that are "good" and "bad").

For humans, our primary tool for survival is reason (the ability to posit relationships between objects that aren't explicitly connected, i.e. to hypothesize and symbolize/abstract). Our bodies make us feel hungry, but only our minds can help us find food and learn the difference between sustenance and poison. Rationality is thus a "virtue," a behavior we should practice and cultivate in order to live a healthy life.

You could object that there are plenty of people that have survived by being irrational and by parasitically preying on others. But if you are committed to goal X, you ought to adopt means that ensure optimal achievement of X. And just because a goal can be achieved with a given means doesn't make those the best means. For example, you might be able to cross the street by jaywalking blindfolded. Does that make blindfolded jaywalking a good street-crossing policy?

Similarly, you might be able to survive on a deserted island if you simply waited around for hunters to pass by and then raided their supplies. But what happens when all the hunters are gone? On the other hand, if you put in hard work and effort to build up a food supply and traded the surplus with others, building friendships in the meantime on which you could rely in emergencies and which would provide company and enjoyment (warding off loneliness and depression), you would be contributing to the best of your ability to your survival.

Rational self-interest, then, is good (because it is the best means to our goals) and doesn't involve parasitism but rather a lot of self-discipline and restraint.

>>57

Every definition of morality is a moral theory. It's meaningless to suggest that there's a 'correct' one. That's why there are so many moral theories floating about... nobody has been able to convince anyone that it's any good. Every once in a while a person discovers a 'theory' that's in synch with their own ethics, and vaunt it for some reason unique to the individual.

You can derive an 'ought' from an 'if', but not from an 'is'. That's the point; moral theories universally attempt to derive a mode of behaviour from an atomic concept or set of concepts that most people will accept as fact. They are all failures.

That there exists some idea or fact that will conclusively provide some guidance from human behaviour is a claim that needs to be proved (if you want to prove it). Nobody has ever succeeded; those who vaunt moral theories would disagree, but people who champion other moral theories disagree with them, too, and vice versa.

I would say that 'ought' means that the course of action indicated will lead to the stated intended outcome, such as 'If I want to convince someone, I ought to explain my point of view pretty well.' An is-ought statement is a meaningless one. Unfortunately, the evidence is the sum total of written English corpus, and the meaning of the word is open to intepretation. Because of this, all I can do is offer my intepretation, and hope that it matches up to personal experience. All I can say is that I am particularly confident that it will stand up to scrutiny.

The burden of proof is a legal term. People are only burdened to provide proof if they wish it.

The problem with objectivism is that it presents moral theories, and draws conclusions that don't stand up to scrutiny. A lot of the substance of objectivism is similar to my own outlook, however. I won't go into my personal ethical codes in depth, but I too live life in a rational manner. I control my emotions, extricate conflicting goals, and work towards completing my goals by gathering the appropriate understanding and taking action.

I have reasoned (independently of Rand) that self-interest has a part to play in the achievement of goals. That doesn't mean the self-interest is morally good. Goals that exist as a part of a rational mind are achieved because they are part of a rational mind, and because that mind exists as a part of a human body, and that body exists as a part of society. That achieving goals is satisfying in some way is a part of that equation. That's all there is to it; it's the fact of the matter. There's no need to muddy the waters with nonsense about morality, and that's the failure of objectivism.

>>58

If the burden of proof is only "a legal term", then why do you keep resorting to it in order to try and prove that all moral theories are false? You keep saying moral theories need to be proved and no one has proved them, therefore they should all be rejected. But according to you I only need to prove my moral theory if I wish to. So your main objection is self-refuting and falls flat on its face.

The fact is, anyone making a positive claim about reality (that X is or is not the case) bears a burden of justification if their claim is to be accepted as true; this is philosophy 101. It's disingenuous to try and dodge this by claim only people who disagree with you need to prove what they are saying. Why do you consider your position so infallible that it doesn't need to be justified by argument? With this tactic you could "argue" that the sun revolves around the earth by appealing to the Bible or to Aristotle like the Scholastics did.

Your position basically entails that there is absolutely nothing objectively wrong with murder, rape, robbery, or torturing children. This is a startling claim for many people and it needs some justification if it's going to be accepted.

>It's meaningless to suggest that there's a 'correct' [moral theory].
>moral theories [...] are all failures.
>Nobody has ever succeeded...

Yet again, these are all assertions that you simply assert without providing any justification. If you believe strongly that all moral theories are failures, then no one will ever be able to convince you otherwise. But you are only revealing your own prejudices; you certainly aren't disproving moral theories.

I provided what I think is a more or less convincing "proof" of ethical egoism. Of course, I could be quite wrong. But instead of seriously criticizing or responding to me and SHOWING me what mistakes I've made in reasoning, you've just shut your eyes and ears and insisted dogmatically that all moral theories are flawed nonsense and that Objectivism "doesn't stand up to scrutiny". That is a position of faith, not a position of reason.

>You can derive an 'ought' from an 'if', but not from an 'is'.

I believe that is a distinction without a difference. If it *IS* the case that X desires Y, then X *ought* to pursue the means to Y.

Your last point is the old non-cognitivist argument. (1) If there really were a way to deduce moral theory, then there would be a general consensus on it. (2) Instead we see endless disagreement, so (3) there must be no way to deduce moral theory.

I don't think this is sound because I dispute the truth of premise (1). Why is it that everyone needs to agree on moral theories in order for them to be entertained? Can you prove this? There are many other subjects in which there are all sorts of disputes, about method, evidence, theories, etc. For example, there are Keynesian, monetarist, econometric, public-choice, Marxist, Georgist, Austrian, and mainsteam-neoclassical approaches to economic theory. There's dispute, not only about policy prescriptions and theories, but even about how to ask meaningful questions. Yet most people wouldn't say that this in itself shows that any economic knowledge is impossible.

The reason why there's a lot debate in ethics probably has more to do with the subject matter (human activity), which is extremely complex and not susceptible to simple model building, than it does with any inherent subjectivity. Nevertheless, there are some basic principles which most people agree are necessary, if not exactly sufficient, for establishing truth: logic and evidence. If an ethical theory obeys these two principles just like the sciences do, why should we dismiss it out of hand instead of at least critically engaging with it?

>>59

I'm making multiple assertions here, so let's break them down.

1. Morality is meaningless
2. Objectivism as it is defined fails because it describes itself as a moral theory, not necessarily because of the entire substance of its suggestions.
3. Objectivism also fails because, as all moral theories do, it appeals to the is-ought gap.

The assertion that morality is meaningless isn't an uncommon one; it's the non-cognitivist position.

A empirical proof that morality is meaningless would require the development of a lingual corpus that would show that the word cannot reliably be used to communicate a singular concept. A rational proof would require a set of agreed upon axioms from which to derive a conclusion; if the empirical proof (that morality is meaningless) were to be positive, it would make the rational proof unobtainable. If the empirical proof were negative, the rational proof should also be negative.

I submit that a definition of morality requires a definition of what morally right and wrong mean, and that such a definition is a moral theory. Further, I submit that the existence of many moral theories, and the fact that no moral theory is accepted by the majority or even a large minority constitutes an empirical proof that morality is meaningless.

The failure of objectivism is that it submits that rational self-interest is morally good. If you take the view that a moral theory defines what good is, then the common acceptance of objectivism would mean that objectivism would define what 'morally good' means. On its own, this still provides no more a clear suggestion as to what a person ought to do with their life than the fact that a circle can be defined as a flat sphere. In order to motivate people to obey the precepts of objectivism, it needs to stand alone to convince people, whether or not it is 'moral'. That is my point; objectivism doesn't need to be a moral theory. Describing itself as a moral theory is pointless.

All moral theories describe what a person ought to do. They are designed to convince people to behave in a certain way; philosophers are rather keen that this should be accomplished by virtue of the fact that they should represent a self-evident truth.

I won't dispute that a person ought to use reason to achieve their own goals, for without reason the path to achieving goals cannot be understood and a person cannot thus express their will. The question is; ought a person pursue goals? If you want to boil down Rand's reasoning to its minimum, she is saying that goals exist(exist=is); therefore, a person ought to pursue those goals. The failure to breach the is-ought gap derives from the fact that her statement goes beyond stating that person ought to do what is necessary to pursue a goal if he wishes to achieve that goal; it is the suggestion that goals necessitate their own resolution.

Rand says a lot of things, a lot that I agree with and a lot that I don't. I don't need any ethical guidelines produced by somebody else to tell me how to live, though, so I don't even care.

I do what I want. That's my ethical code, in a nutshell.

>>61
>If you want to boil down Rand's reasoning to its minimum, she is saying that goals exist(exist=is); therefore, a person ought to pursue those goals.
According to Rand every person makes one fundamental choise all the time: Life or not-life? If you for any reason choose not-life you have no need for morals, ethics, or reason, or anything else for that matter. You don't have to make any further choises, as not choosing to do anything is the same thing as dying.

By choosing life you set up a goal for yourself, to keep on living and therefore ought to use your survival tool - your mind - to fulfill that goal.

>>62

"By choosing life you set up a goal for yourself, to keep on living and therefore ought to use your survival tool - your mind - to fulfill that goal."

That jumps the shark. People should value life? Okay. Well, how to live a good life was the question we were trying to answer in the first place.

It's when we get down to the practical advice Rand gives ("Don't vote for the democrats!", "Invade Russia!", etc) that we start leaving philosophy and get sidetracked by empiricism.

>>61

I believe your position rests on an equivocation between "morality" and "morally right/wrong". The former refers solely to the issue of what is right and what is wrong, to the question of principles concerning the distinction between good and bad behavior. The latter refers to a stance on that issue, to a definite opinion on whether there are such principles and whether they can be justified.

To return to my example: there are Keynesian, monetarist, econometric, public-choice, Marxist, Georgist, Austrian, and mainsteam-neoclassical approaches to economic theory. Does this mean "economics" is meaningless? No, because the word simply refers to the study of economic phenomena. Similarly, the word "morality" (or "ethics", as I would prefer to call it) could be used to refer solely to the issue of what is right and what is wrong, independent of the means by which we answer that question or what our answers are.

To make it clear the way you did:

1) "Morality", "morally good", and "morally wrong" should be seperated conceptually.
2) "Morality" refers solely to the issue of ought and ought-not; there certainly is agreement on this meaning, just like there is agreement on the meaning of "economics".
3) "Morally good" and "morally wrong" refer to an opinion on morality, the same way "good economics" and "bad economics" refer to an opinion on economics. An Objectivist considers rational self-interest morally good and a Keynesian, say, considers Georgism bad economics.

Now, there is an agreement on (2) but obviously NOT a total agreement on what comprises (3) (though most human cultures share prohibitions on murder, rape, incest, cannibalism, theft, etc.). Yet this applies to almost every field of study, particularly the social sciences which studies the same phenomenon, human activity. So I submit that by the logic of your own argument, in addition to considering morality meaningless, we ought also to consider philosophy, political science, history, and even the natural sciences to some extent all meaningless as well.

I don't see any reason to do that because the mere fact that there exists disagreement does not in principle rule out the possibility that that disagreement could be resolved. In the social sciences there is general agreement as to how to go about resolving that disagreement, namely through the scientific method. In moral philosophy, there appears to be such an agreement as well, for example, that your sentences should be grammatical, your conclusions should follow from your premises and that you should attack others' views fairly stated and not strawmen.

Incidentally, I believe your non-cognitivism is undermined by your own argument. Namely, there is not only a divergence of moral theories; that is, theories that "morally good" means such and such -- the divergence includes amoral theories! Namely, theories that "morally good" doesn't mean anything. So if we ought to refuse to entertain moral theories because of divergence, it seems to me your moral skepticism, part and parcel of that divergence for a long time, ought to be discarded as well.

>The failure to breach the is-ought gap derives from the fact that [Rand's] statement goes beyond stating that person ought to do what is necessary to pursue a goal if he wishes to achieve that goal; it is the suggestion that goals necessitate their own resolution.

I don't believe that Rand's ethics demands that goals necessitate their own resolution.

We simply start with the observation that human beings are entities that are engaged in goal-directed action; that is, they seek values. We deduce that their ultimate value must be their life and that the means to such an end is rational self-interest. Then we say that the value that human beings are already committed to commits them further to the value of rational self-interest. It is not a demand that you ought to achieve your goals so much as a recognition that you want to achieve your goals and here's how.

>>67

The comparison to economics is irrelevant. Economics is the study of human productivity, and the various models that have been established to analyse productivity are discrete and well-defined methods of analysis. The question of what economics is can be easily answered because the definition of the word is widely accepted and refers to words and concepts that are logical, defined and well accepted.

The question of what morality is can easily be defined as what a person unconditionally ought or ought not to do, but I have observed that these are non-concepts. What it is morally wrong is what ought not to be done unconditionally. To say that one ought not to do something unconditionally defies the meaning of 'ought'. To provide conditions is to relegate a moral theory to a mere pragmatic suggestion. Consider the following two statements;

"I ought not to kill a man because it is illegal"
"I ought not to kill a man because it is illegal and I don't want to risk getting caught and tried for the crime."

The first statement is recognised as a moral statement, whereas the second can only be considered a pragmatic statement. You cannot derive an 'ought' from a 'is' (a statement of fact); it is illogical, and all moral statements can be recognised from the fact they display an is-ought gap. If a statement does not leave an is-ought gap, then it is not recognised as a moral statement.

Rand does not have a monopoly on rationality. You don't have to obey Rand just because she said rationality is a good thing. I'm perfectly rational, and I think Rand's full of shit, and I'm far from the only one. I've tried to keep the focus on her ethics works in criticising her, to keep on topic, but her epistemology, opinions on society and politics and so on are far from convincing. If you want to wrap all that up as a part of single ethical code, then as an ethical code it is just shit. Her conclusions may have suited her but because her goals are different my goals and I daresay most peoples goals, her treatise on the means to achieve those goals are worthless to most people. As a means to achieve happiness, well, she wasn't a very happy person and not every objectivist is happy, and not everyone wants to be happy anyway.

No, I don't like objectivism.

I like my own ethics. I control my emotions, derive joy from life and attain wisdom as a means in itself and as a pragmatic step in solving all of lifes problems. I behave rationally. I don't need to justify my behaviour, I don't need to name my ethics, and I don't feel the need to have my ethics validated by the opinions of others.

>>68

For one thing, you can tone down the ranting a little. It doesn't really matter whether you "don't like" Objectivism or you think it's "shit". What are you, in the fifth grade? What are you trying to prove? I'm not an Objectivist either and I don't buy most everything Rand said (and I've never been able to finish Atlas Shrugged). However, I do think she made an interesting contribution in terms of ethical theory that is worth discussing and exploring. I'd never jump on the bandwagon and dismiss her out of hand even though admittedly it is fashionable and politically correct to do so.

You say the comparison to economics is "irrelevant" (unsurprisingly) and"the various models that have been established to analyse productivity are discrete and well-defined". Maybe, but they aren't nearly widely accepted, which was your whole argument to begin with. Steve Keen is notorious for his withering critique of the mainstream models, nobel laureate Paul Krugman and Ha Joon Chang for their critiques of "free trade" theory, Ludwig Lachmann and the George Mason hermeneutists for their radical subjectivism, nobel laureate F. A. Hayek for his skepticism of economic aggregates and other Austrians for their apriorism and critique of perfectly competitive equilibrium. This isn't to mention newer heterodox schools like Modern Monetary Theory, Post-Keynesianism, etc. Marxists for the most part have yet to abandon the labour theory of value. And there are all sorts of similar disagreements in history, in sociology, in political science, in the natural sciences, and indeed in philosophy as a whole.

It seems to me quite clear that if you what to dismiss ethics as a study because it hasn't yet reached a definitive conclusion as to what is right and what is wrong, then you ought to dismiss all of these subjects too, since we certainly have no definite consensus yet on, say, what happened during WWII or whether democracy can overcome public-choice interest-group problems. New discoveries and arguments are made all the time. Indeed, what you are basically doing is saying: subject X which studies Y should be dismissed because it has yet to find out what Y really is. Well that's the whole point of subject X in the first place! How are we supposed to FIND OUT what Y is if you insist that we shouldn't even attempt it?

And on that note, how have you "observed" that "what a person unconditionally ought or ought not to do" is a "non-concept"? You provided a very flimsy argument for non-cognitivism which doesn't seem to hold up. And you didn't answer my other point, namely that if we are to dismiss ethics as a field of study, then your non-cognitivism has to be dismissed too, since it is part of the very divergence of opinion that you think makes ethics so pointless. Everyone should just remain totally agnostic on the issue until further notice.

You also, for some reason, continue to insist that an ought cannot be derived from an is. But it's so easy, as I said. All a statement has to do is take the form of a problematic hypothetical imperative: if it is the case that you seek this end, then you ought to take the following steps. This statement can certainly be empirically verified. Your objection was that goals do not necessitate their own resolution. But the only reason why a goal is adopted in the first place its resolution is sought, otherwise the "goal" wouldn't exist. And it's perfectly reasonable to suggest to that agent that the values he is committed to necessarily commits him to further values of which he wasn't aware.

You use the word "pragmatic" almost with contempt. But why? If we assume the point of ethics is the study of what makes for a happy, fulfilling life, like Aristotle and Rand did, then ethics does in fact turn into a sort of practical "life-advice". What's wrong with that? Why should philosophy be confined to the ivory tower?

>>69

My point is that a moral theory constitutes a definition of what what is morally right or wrong means, and the fact that no moral theory is widely accepted means that there exists no useful definition of what moral right or wrong is; this makes morality meaningless. Economic theories don't constitute a definition of economics. You can't dismiss economics as a field of study because the term is meaningless because it isn't. The definition of genocide is well-accepted, but genocide isn't. Do you understand?

The terms 'ethics' and 'morality' are used fairly interchangeably, but ethics can be considered a broader term that includes morality, but also other analyses of behaviour including the analysis of virtue, values, and so on. I take the view that any 'ought' statement only carries meaning if it is conditional, and moral statements can be recognised by their failure to provide such a condition. That doesn't mean that ethics as a field of inquiry is now off-limits. If you throw away morality according to these conditions, ethics becomes an analysis of the choices people make, the reasons people make them and the consequences of those choice; all-in-all, in my opinion, a much more robust field of inquiry. After all, if moral right and wrong are non-concepts, then people have never really been making moral decisions; but people have been making decisions, and those decisions have been studied as ethics.

I prefer not to argue for or against things. The idea that people have to pick a name for some philosophical position and throw arguments at people in order to defend it is a stupid, tribal mentality. I'd rather just explain things and try to inspire people to draw their own conclusions. I've also noted over the years how unproductive internet arguments are, especially when you get into things like counter-quoting and posting links as 'evidence' and all that shit. It's far more productive to describe what you've personally observed and explain what you think you've learned. With philosophy, the only evidence you need is the experience of a lifetime; the best theory is whatever one explains human experience most satisfactorily. If you're wrong, you're unlikely to convince anyone. If you're right, it doesn't even matter if the person argues against you; their experience will conform to the explanation you've given them and they'll gradually change their mind.

I'm not going to explain the is-ought gap. Read the wiki article on it. It's Hume's observation, not mine, and it's fantastically robust.

Pragmastism is great. I'm just pointing out that a qualified 'ought' statement is a pragmatic, not a moral one.

>>69

"since we certainly have no definite consensus yet on, say, what happened during WWII or whether democracy can overcome public-choice interest-group problems."

Those are kind of like the evolution versus creationism debates. There are serious disagreements over things like insider trading law and precise inflation targets, but not warfare Keynesianism or the possibility of negating public choice theory.

I'm just being a fifth grader though, carry on with the argument over semantics. For what it's worth, I think that the definition of any word depends on context.

>>72

Absotively, and that's why we make the distinction of describing, for example, moral right. Right can be defined as a relative direction, correct, a politcal leaning, a moral position, and possibly some other stuff that I can't think of right now. Some people will deliberately misintepret your meaning to avoid a valid point you've made.

>>70

You don't need to "explain" the is-ought gap, because there is no "is-ought gap". It's a whole-cloth fabrication. In the very same volume where Hume observes that there is no NECESSARY connection between what situation obtains and what situations ought to obtain (a perfectly valid observation, since you have to introduce another premise to make that connection), he goes on to observe that there are certain kinds of social orders that are most likely to promote human welfare. Thus it becomes possible to say that if your goal is to promote human welfare, you ought to adopt such and such a socio-economic system.

The idea that there is this insurmountable gap between is and ought is an unbelievable exaggeration completely refuted by everyday experience. We make valid "is-ought" judgements all the time, in the form of hypothetical imperatives (should you seek goal A, do X, Y, and Z), which are certainly empirically testable. And as I said, if the gap were so unbridgeable, then to be consistent you would have to object philosophically whenever doctors prescribe treatment to sick patients.

I'm glad you say that "economic theories don't constitute a definition of economics". My point is that, by the same token, moral theories don't constitute a definition of morality. There is a distinct difference between a field of inquiry and outcomes OF that inquiry.

> I take the view that any 'ought' statement only carries meaning if it is conditional, and moral statements can be recognised by their failure to provide such a condition.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that the statement "If X wants A, X should do Z" is conditional and therefore not a moral statement? Okay, I agree with that.

But here's a possibility: what if we replaced the problematic hypothetical imperative with an *assertoric* hypothetical imperative, i.e. "SINCE X wants A, X should do Z", which can easily be truncated to "X should do Z"? Since, if it can be shown that all human beings (even suicidal ones) are involved in a pursuit of life as a result of the mere fact that they are engaged in purposeful action, and that there are certain means which constitute a good life more than any other, i.e. rational self-interest, then we can say unconditionally that all human beings should pursue their rational self-interest. In this way, the pragmatic becomes the moral.

>>74

People don't make valid is-ought judgements all the time. A person might say, "This is too dangerous. We ought to go back," without mentioning the condition, "If we want to survive." The condition is omitted from everyday conversation because the conditional statement is assumed to be affirmative. It's the same with any example you'd care to give. Moral statements fail to bridge the is-ought gap because the condition is irrelevant to the spirit of the moral theory.

Take the divine command issue. The classical moral theory of Abrahamic religions is that God exists and has provided these commands; therefore, we ought to obey the commands. You're not supposed to obey because you fear the hellfire or want to go into heaven, although those would constitute conditions that would make obeying the commandments a pragmatic decision; you're supposed to obey the commandments because it is morally right to do so. The ought doesn't logically follow from the is and cannot. Moral statements all suffer from the is-ought problem, and that's how we recognise them as moral statements. Conditional, pragmatic suggestions don't, and that's why people don't have anywhere near as much trouble taking advice as they do accepting moral statements that are alien to them.

>>74

How do you know purposeful action exists? How do you know anything exists?

Anything you say can be infinitely regressed or semantically dicked with to death, and I think this is why philosophers shy away from saying things like, "I've discovered an objectively true morality!" That doesn't have any logical appeal over just saying, "Hey, I have an intuitively plausible system of morality that rests on certain untestable assumptions, such as, 'I'm not Neo in The Matrix.'"

>>74
Ok, first I just want to say that I agree with you and enjoy reading your comments in this discussion I did find something here that I feel must be adressed.

>Since, if it can be shown that all human beings (even suicidal ones) are involved in a pursuit of life as a result of the mere fact that they are engaged in purposeful action
Rand never stated that all humans act in their own rational self-interest, in fact she said that most didn't. She did, however, say that humans should act in their own rational self-interest.

The distinction is an important one as a suicide would likely be considered tragic, by Rand, but not a moral or even necessarily an immoral action. As has been stated before, life is a pre-moral choise according to Objectivism. An individual first chooses to live, and only then does morals come into question.

However, Rand also stated that you could give up your own life in your rational self-interest, but that requires you to do so in an attempt to save something you love so much that you wouldn't be able to live without it.

>>58
You rebut by saying the ought was derived from an if, not an is, but then, what's wrong with that? What does that prove? A technicality? That morality only matters if you choose to live, and that if you choose to die, there are no oughts, since death is the default result of non-action? You see, your rebuttal completely defeats the usefulness the is-ought gap once had to you; it ceases to be an argument against morality.

>>78
Small tidbit, but a case where suicide would be in service to your life would be if the continued pursuit of values has been made impossible. An example could be a terminal illness which brings with it intense suffering.

>>75

>A person might say, "This is too dangerous. We ought to go back," without mentioning the condition, "If we want to survive."

Okay, but just to nitpick, the conclusion *does* follow from the premises (stated or unstated), making the statement valid.

I think the robustness of Randian ethics comes from the fact that its imperatives are assertoric rather than problematic. The way I interpret it, Rand doesn't need to say, "If you want to survive, pursue your rational self-interest." Of course, she *does say that* in a few places, but she could just as easily omit it, in my view. Rather she can say, "Since you want to survive, pursue your self-interest." It's not really conditional anymore.

>>76

I think the proposition "Human beings act purposefully" is axiomatic. You can't really deny it without engaging in purposeful action and thus affirming it. Even the decision not to act would be an action. Of course it's true that if, say, you're in a coma you don't act, but all the proposition states is that humans act, not that they ALWAYS act, in the same way that birds fly but aren't always found in the air.

>>78

>Rand never stated that all humans act in their own rational self-interest
Okay but I didn't either, so...

I know that the orthodox Objectivist view is that there is such a thing as a "pre-moral choice to live," that we really can't induce anyone to decide one way or another, and that morality only applies ONCE they make it. You can certainly find evidence for that in a lot of what Rand writes.

However, I side with Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl on this; I think that *every choice*, so to speak, is a choice to live, one that we really can't avoid making so long as we are conscious. In fact, Den Uyl subjected the orthodox view to a convincing reductio ad absurdum, in my view:

http://new.stjohns.edu/media/3/48cee569ff2245f89833c259f23b950b.pdf
>Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, the doctrine of premoral choice. Let us grant also that life is the ultimate value. Given then an initial choice to live and life as the ultimate value, all choices beyond the first one will be measured in terms of being either choices to live or choices about the means to live. Choices that do not respect the ultimate end of life are choices not to live. But if all this is so, then the “official position” has no ethics whatsoever; because if all of the foregoing assumptions hold, then all choices are choices between life and “death.” And if that is so, then all choices are in the same state as the first choice. Thus, either all choices are premoral—they all must make an initial commitment to life first, and so on ad infinitum—or there is no such thing as a premoral choice that originates morality. The latter alternative is compatible with and implied by the neo-Aristotelian alternative to the “official doctrine.”

I'm going to regret posting here, but whatever.

>>82

That's not the point. Cogito ergo sum. Whatever you claim is only valid if your reasoning process is correct, and there's no way to test whether that's the case.

I don't see much point in testing that, either. The thread is stuck in an infinite loop of the O'ist guy deriving an ought from an is, without much explanation behind it, and Shipguy disregarding this and going on about other things. The clearest example of how the "unconditional morality" we're talking about doesn't work is that it doesn't work in real life.

Take the famous ethical dilemma of someone who has to steal medicine to treat their fatally ill friend, or treat themselves. Steal the medicine? You've just violated the Prime Directive of Objectivism. Let your friend die because you don't want to steal? You've just sacrificed yourself/someone you care about, and O'ists aren't supposed to do that either. inb4 "I feel no need to respond, because that situation is impossible/you didn't read Atlas Shrugged/I'm a guy and I can't get pregnant."

I bet pretty much any moral system you can think of, you can find some issue with it, especially cases where the moral system's own rules come into conflict.

>>82
In response to the ending quote:
Any choice to die requires no action, as death is the default result when no action is taken, therefore there can be no motivation to act in any way if the choice is death. That means any choice against life, as described in the quote, directly contradicts any choice to act at all. Anyone who is still keeping themselves alive has obviously made the choice to live, else they would not be keeping themselves alive and would quickly die. Thus any choice against that choice is fundamentally a contradiction, hence immorality.

>>83
Sum ergo cogito. Existence is primary, not consciousness. Reality is the arbiter of your reason. Consider the distinction between valid and sound reasoning. If reasoning does not contradict itself, it is valid; if it does not contradict itself or reality, it is sound. You just said there is no such thing as sound, in this sense. You also said you have no way of knowing if you are correct about having no way of knowing if you are correct, rendering your words meaningless by self-declaration.

>The thread is stuck in an infinite loop of the O'ist guy deriving an ought from an is, without much explanation behind it, and Shipguy disregarding this and going on about other things.
This contradicts reality. An 'if' was used to bridge 'is' and 'ought,' and the other guy claimed such is invalid for no reason further than the fact that 'if' is used as a bridge between them, saying it is invalid simply because it does not derive ought purely from and 'is' with zero 'if' conditions. This, of course, renders the 'is-ought gap' useless as an argument against morality as a whole (as an argument for moral nihilism).

>The clearest example of how the "unconditional morality" we're talking about doesn't work is that it doesn't work in real life.
Who's talking about unconditional morality? Not the O'ists here. Unconditional morality is self-contradictory, anyway. Morality, by definition, poses the question, "What is the good?" Well, good for whom and what? See, it's already conditional from the beginning.

>>85

"If reasoning does not contradict itself, it is valid; if it does not contradict itself or reality, it is sound."

Let me put it into very concrete terms. What if you really are Neo in The Matrix, and what you think is rationality is actually a delusion foisted upon you by Agent Smith as he plays with your brain? There's no way to prove that isn't happening. Do you get it?

As for the rest, I believe some Anon back a ways claimed that no condition was necessary. Guess that wasn't you. I'm done infinitely regressing for now. But you'd think that if concepts like "life" and "self-esteem" (or whatever other values you expect objective morality to involve) were definable, it would be pretty easy to develop a scientific and non-self-contradicting framework for attaining them.

There ought to be an objective, measurable quality to these things if they exist. There ought to be O'ists running around with their own official, ARI-issued Self-Esteem-O-Scopes showing everyone else how deep into the red they are. But that isn't happening. And there's no particular indication it's possible.

>>88
79 was my first post in this thread, just to clear up any confusion of my involvement before that.

The Matrix is a brain-in-vat scenario (a term here referring to Descartes' evil demon, dream world, and any claim that reality is an illusion), so I will refer to it in those terms. Brain-in-vat scenarios are purely arbitrary, self-refuting, and philosophically irrelevant.

A brain-in-vat scenario's validity is, by definition and your own description (you can't prove you're not), unknowable to the alleged brain in the alleged vat. This is why the claim is arbitrary, and as such can be dismissed immediately, but let's go a bit further.

It presupposes the existence of such things as brains, vats, illusions, etc. which are concepts created using the rational faculty and ultimately tracing back to (ultimately derived from) perceptual observation of reality, meaning the claim presupposes the validity of said rational faculty, the perceptual observation from which it abstracts concepts, and the reality in question (existence is still primary to consciousness), so the claim rests on the very premises it is attempting to refute. You are familiar with the fallacy of Begging the Question, yes? It is assuming, in the proof, the very thing one is trying to prove. The brain-in-vat scenario assumes, in the proof, the very thing it is trying to disprove. Since this fallacy, while similar, is distinct from Begging the Question, Ayn Rand referred to it as the fallacy of the Stolen Concept. This is why it is self-refuting, but again, let's go a bit further.

What we've gotten from the brain-in-vat scenario is that existence is still primary to consciousness, rationality is still valid, and senses, percepts and their derivations are still valid. This means all which follows from those premises is still valid. This is why it is philosophically irrelevant.

Human beings draw on experience to form a conceptual framework of how a world works. This entails concepts of past and future. Lessons from the past can be used to make predictions about the future, and this enables a person to act rationally.

Reality vs. illusion is a false dichotomy; if both are considered to form the substance of human experience, they are equivelant. As far as ethics is concerned, this is only a problem for moral codes dependent on so-called objective truths. Objective truths exist outside the realm of a human being's necessarily subjective experience, and therefore can't logically tethered to any aspect of human experience.

>>89

"meaning the claim presupposes the validity of said rational faculty,"

Not necessarily. That could just be what Agent Smith wants you to think!

What I'm asking is, "Did you ever consider that you might be wrong?" If you answer yes, that's a problem. If you answer no, then that concludes our discussion.

>>74
Now I agree with you in most of your explanations of Objectivist theory, and I appreciate your attempt to explain Objectivist theory to others, however, I feel like the following is a huge flaw in your argument.

>Since, if it can be shown that all human beings (even suicidal ones) are involved in a pursuit of life as a result of the mere fact that they are engaged in purposeful action
This has nothing to do with Objectivism as the philosophy never states that all humans automatically act rationally or in their own self-interest. In fact, Rand said that most didn't and the fact that we don't automatically do so is the reason why rational thoughts are so important.

Furthermore Objectivism states that life is a pre-moral choise. It's not until an individual has choosen to live that he requires morals - as a tool for survival. Suicide in this case cannot be viewed as "an purposeful act" or "choise" as refusing to choose anything would have the exact same result.

>>92
>"Did you ever consider that you might be wrong?"
That is what resulted in the lengthy post you largely ignored, as you will be from this point on.

>>94

A null response is probably your best bet at this point; I agree. For anyone else interested in math, the proof of Godel's second incompleteness theorem (essentially, that all reasoning rests on unproveable axioms) is a more lengthy statement of my point.

>>92
>Not necessarily. That could just be what Agent Smith wants you to think!
This sounds exactly like the same argument given by christians when pressured about all the inconsistencies in the Bible and all the proof for evolution and dinosaurs and what have you. You know, when they say "well, obviously it's because God wants it to be that way so that he can test our faith". Regardless of wether that's true or not that's still an assumption made without any proof what so ever. The fact that the conclussion happened to be that precise is nothing more than a coincidence, it could just as well have been "because pink flying teddy bears that caused WWI live in the forest" or, you know, any other conclussion completely detached from reality.

Or to make a parallel a little closer to the subject at hand; when studying philosophy in school there was this one kid that tried to outsmart the teacher when he talked about the fact that you can be certain that you, yourself, exist because you think, by saying something along the lines of "how can I be certain of that? How do I really know that I think, or that it's really me for that matter?"

The teacher, probably being used to those kind of stupid questions immediatly answered that "you know that something exists, and that something is what you percieve as thoughts, and those thoughts are derived from somewhere - maybe it's not from the head you believe you see in the mirror every day - but there's still something creating those thoughts somewhere and whatever that is, is you".

Anyway, right now, you're acting like that kid. Coming to irrational conclussions in an attempt to outsmart your opponent, and no - I'm not the one you answered to. I'm mostly observing this debate at this point, but I could not let your comment go unanswered.

>>98

The point was that a logical system cannot prove all its own axioms. The argument was ridiculous, but it was merely meant to present a possibility.

If there is any doubt in your mind that an objective morality may be incorrect, if there are conceivable circumstances in which its axioms could be found false, then that renders it unproveable. Intuitively plausible, maybe, but intuition is not logic.

As for the anecdote, I don't see how something becomes less true when a child says it instead of one of the most famous mathematicians of the 20th century.

>>102

I get what Godel is saying, but it's no problem at all that any logical system (human knowledge, say) rests upon unproveable axioms. I've known for a long time that knowledge is tautological in nature, that everything is defined by everything else in the web. The web of logical connections is never 'complete' or 'correct', it merely is. The reason why humans can conceive of concepts is because we possess an organ that allows us to do so; the brain. The brain is a functional organ that helps to direct the human body to ends that satisfy its own instincts and purposes.

In other words, it's enough that the human capacity for sagacity, it's ability to conceive of concepts, is useful. You can't rationally prove that what you understand to be true represents the 'real world'. Indeed, 'real world' in this sense hasn't got any meaning; if the term had an accurate meaning, you'd be able to prove it from pre-existing axioms or vice versa. What you can do is test your conceptual model of the world, built up from experience, against further experience, and use that to refine the model, because the model is useful.

That all said... we know that the ability to grasp concepts is a function of our brain, one function of the brain. The concept neurons are knitted up to all the other neurons in the body, not just in the brain, but all the nerve cells. Our conceptual model of the universe is informed by these nervous impulses, and in turn helps to direct the human body, through the nerves, which alters the world.

If the arrangement of neurons gives rise to concepts, then the totality of human experience, not just the part of the mind which gives rise to what we call concepts, might itself be viewed as a single, complex 'concept' as part of a wider, non-conceptual material universe.

That said, if you accept that the substance of concepts is allowed for by neurons, and the substance of those neurons is composed of particle interactions, then at some level all matter in the universe is composed of the same 'stuff' as human consciousness. Every particle in the universe interacts, via discrete force interactions, with every other particle, in the same way as every neuron interacts with every other neuron via the synapses as they fire. Matter is composed of a complex web of 'logical' interactions, just as concepts are. If that's the case, then the mind might be compared to an emulator running under another operating system; seperate from, but interacting with a larger and more fundemental reality than it's own, with the same principles at work.

Taking that view, you would have to accept that you may never really 'know' the universe as it is, but your knowledge is nevertheless a part of that universe; and that that may be the limit of what you can know about that. It might be more productive, if that doesn't satisfy you, why it doesn't satisfy you.

>>102
>As for the anecdote, I don't see how something becomes less true when a child says it instead of one of the most famous mathematicians of the 20th century.
No, it doesn't become less true - I never said that - but a false statement is also false regardless of who stated it. A shovel is a shovel and should be called so.

SAGE has been used.

>>104

You can look up his proof if you like. Godel's second theorem- you can find it on Google within a few minutes, probably. Refute that, get back to me, and then go claim your well deserved Nobel prize.

>>103

"In other words, it's enough that the human capacity for sagacity, it's ability to conceive of concepts, is useful."

I agree. Logic is hard to grasp, but intuitive knowledge is useful. In order to say anything, one must assume certain things without proof.

This is all a tangent from the original discussion about the validity of Objectivism. The main problem with this philosophy is that its values either don't click with most people's intuitive semantics ("it's in the self interest of poor people to protest food stamps", "dying in defense of your country is not self sacrifice", etc.), or are poorly defined and impossible to measure.

>>105

I would say that logic is the structure of conceptual knowledge. Formal logic is a 'language' for that structure. So-called 'intuitive' knowledge is probably just some form of the social norm being regurgitated without thought.

A person who understands something can explain what they mean; the more they understand, the more they can explain. That's all I think there is to knowledge.

>>108

Okay, to keep things productive as was suggested, I'll answer why. I cannot see how initial axioms can be derived without intuition- intuition being defined as, "the ability to acquire knowledge without inference or reason". Establishing that neuron interactions represent a depiction of the rules of the reality they inhabit seems to accord with this, if the validity of these rules is derived from the existence of these interactions ipso facto.

But mentioning that human experience merely "might" be part of a nonconceptual entity creates additional possibilities. This means that concepts themselves are derived from nonconcepts which posses characteristics absent from accessible knowledge.

An empirical issue I have with the example regarding neuron functioning as a microcosm of the principles of reality is that the cognitive representation of the latter is imperfect. Cognition can deviate from what is generally accepted as rational; mental disorders are an extreme example of this.

>>110

Yeah I can't argue with any of this. I think we're of a like mind on this issue.

>>115

Been a nice chat, Shipguy.

SAGE has been used.

>>117

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

>>118

Hey, I get the last word.

SAGE has been used.